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Abstract. This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence of politics on the evol-
ution of unemployment rates in 13 industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries
and the U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests of opportunistic and partisan business
cycle models, using richer data and more general specifications than previous studies. In con-
trast to most previous studies, we pay particular attention to the importance of labor market
structure in conditioning the influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigate the
relationship between political stability and economic stability.
The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, with higher unemployment rates pre-
vailing under “right” parties than “left” parties. There is more support for “rational” partisan
models that embody transient partisan impacts than for models with permanent effects. We
find evidence that union power is associated with higher average unemployment rates, but that
centralized bargaining institutions tend to lower unemployment rates. The evidence also sug-
gests that more fragmented coalition governments are associated with higher unemployment
rates than single party governments.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the political determinants of unemployment in a sample
of 13 industrialized nations (the U.S. and 12 European Union countries), from
1960 to 1999. Three major objectives of this paper can be identified. The
first is to undertake improved and generalized tests of the predictions about
unemployment rates made by existing political business cycle (PBC) mod-
els. Our tests consider variants of both “opportunistic” models (Nordhaus,
1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) and “partisan” models (Hibbs, 1977; Chap-
pell and Keech, 1986, 1988; Alesina, 1987; Alesina and Sachs, 1988). The
second objective is to investigate how the structure of labor markets affects
the determination of unemployment and conditions the operation of political
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pressures. Our third objective is to investigate how political fragmentation
affects the level or variability of unemployment rates.
A major contribution of this paper is the development of a richer data set
than those used in previous studies investigating political determinants of un-
employment. Our data allows us to distinguish presidential, semi-presidential
and parliamentary governmental regimes, and to refine our empirical tests
to reflect these differences. Improvements in the quality of political data
also allow us to construct a continuous rather than a discrete measure of
governmental ideology. This is particularly important in testing for partisan
differences when coalition governments have been formed by parties with
differing ideologies. Our data set also includes variables describing the struc-
ture of labor markets across time and countries, permitting us to investigate
and control for these conditions as we investigate political influences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of the
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data set, and Section 4 develops
the empirical methodology and describes the results. Finally, a critique and
conclusions are reported in Section 5.
2. Background
This section provides a brief description of the literature relating political in-
fluences to macroeconomic outcomes, particularly unemployment. We review
several well-known models of partisan and opportunistic political business
cycles, discuss microeconomic implications of labor market structures and
political fragmentation for unemployment, and review empirical work that
investigates these subjects using panel data.
2.1. Early models of political business cycles1
Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) describe early versions of what we call
the “opportunistic” political business cycle model. These models assume that
voters evaluate an incumbent politician on the basis of recent macroeconomic
conditions, that the incumbent manipulates election-day conditions in order to
maximize his share of the vote, and that the economy can be represented by an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve. A consequence of these assumptions
is a political business cycle pattern in which unemployment is unsustainably
low in pre-election periods and unsustainably high in post-election periods.
Hibbs (1977) develops an alternative “partisan” political business cycle
model. His model assumes that parties have differing preferences over mac-
roeconomic outcomes, based on the differing intrinsic interests of their clien-
teles. Hibbs’s original model assumes that the economy is characterized by
a Phillips curve featuring a permanently exploitable inflation-unemployment
tradeoff. The key prediction of this model is that as parties alternate in and out
of office, macroeconomic conditions will fluctuate to reflect the preferences
of the current incumbent party. As usually operationalized, unemployment
should be lower when “left” parties control the government, and higher when
“right” parties rule.
2.2. Rational expectations and political business cycles
Both the Nordhaus and Hibbs political business cycle models were un-
dermined by the introduction of the rational expectations hypothesis. If
expectations are rational, then, under plausible circumstances, anticipated
shifts of aggregated demand have no effects on real economic outcomes.
Since partisan and opportunistic manipulations of aggregate demand should
be predictable, unemployment should not be systematically affected.
In recent years, both opportunistic and partisan models have been modified
to incorporate rational expectations. In the opportunistic model of Rogoff and
Sibert (1988),2 voters have rational expectations, but they are imperfectly
informed about the “competence” of policymakers. In equilibrium, the in-
centive to manipulate voters’ beliefs leads politicians to choose an electorally
timed pattern in policy actions. Voters should anticipate this pattern, however,
so it is not obvious that there would be a cycle in unemployment.3
Models introduced by Alesina (1987) and Chappell and Keech (1986)
extend Hibbs’s analysis of party differences to a setting that incorporates
rational expectations. We refer to these as “rational partisan” theories (or RPT
models). Following the example of Barro and Gordon (1983), these mod-
els assume that inflation expectations and nominal wages are set in advance
of monetary policy decisions. If expected inflation were zero, policymakers
would have an incentive to generate an inflation surprise to increase out-
put and lower unemployment. However, since wage-setters are rational and
forward looking, they recognize the incumbent’s incentive to inflate. The
result, in the Barro-Gordon equilibrium, is positive anticipated inflation with
unemployment at its natural rate.
In the rational partisan models, uncertainty about election outcomes pro-
duces uncertainty about future inflation. So long as left and right party
politicians have differing preferences over macroeconomic outcomes, they
will choose different policy actions. Election surprises therefore result in
inflation surprises, which in turn result in temporary deviations of unemploy-
ment from its natural rate. Under the conventional hypothesis, inflation will
be higher under left-wing administrations than right-wing administrations;
furthermore, unemployment will be below its natural rate at the beginning
of a left-wing government and above its natural rate at the beginning of a
right-wing administration. In both the Chappell-Keech and Alesina models,
the existence of long-term labor contracts permits election surprises to be
reflected in persistent but impermanent unemployment fluctuations.
2.3. Political microeconomics
Thus far our review has focused on short-term business cycle attributable
to politically induced variability in macroeconomic policies. However, the
political economy of unemployment encompasses microeconomic issues as
well. In recent years the disparate unemployment performances of the U.S.
and Europe have highlighted microeconomic concerns. Although no single
explanation for the difference is uniformly accepted, “labor market rigidities”
are often invoked to explain persistently high European unemployment rates
(see Siebert, 1997; and Nickell, 1997, among others). Such rigidities might
include high levels of unemployment compensation benefits, high taxes on
labor income, generous welfare programs, restrictions on work time, restric-
tions on layoffs, etc. Determining how each of these policy options affects
unemployment rates is beyond the scope of our investigation here. We will,
however, indirectly address these issues by investigating the link between
unemployment and the sources of political pressure that might produce gov-
ernmental intrusions in labor markets. For example, union membership rates
could serve as a measure of political pressure for labor market restrictions,
resulting in higher unemployment. Alternatively, centralized and highly co-
ordinated bargaining institutions could lower unemployment if they facilitate
multi-lateral concessions by unions who would otherwise seek restrictions.
Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange (1991) further suggest that partisan interactions
with labor market conditions could be important. For example, they find that
left-leaning governments produce lower unemployment when union power
is high and bargaining is centralized, but higher unemployment when labor
markets are flexible and atomistic.
Labor market rigidities also play a role in the “rational” partisan political
business cycle models discussed above. In a perfectly flexible labor market,
wages would quickly adjust to the information provided by elections and
unemployment should not be affected by election surprises. It is only when
rigidities prevent quick wage adjustments that we would observe output and
unemployment fluctuations following elections. This argument suggests that
partisan unemployment effects may be conditioned by structural labor market
conditions.
A second microeconomic route for political influence comes via political
instability. The recent political economic literature suggests that countries
with more unstable political systems tend to have poorer economic perform-
ances (see Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini, 1992; Roubini and Sachs,
1989; and Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini, 1997). The intuition behind this is
that in countries where the government is formed by a coalition of parties,
policy choices are the result of negotiations between contending interest
groups with conflicting interests, and deviations from optimality may occur
due to coordination problems caused by the mechanisms of making collective
choices. Furthermore, if an incumbent has a low probability of being re-
elected, he has a short time planning horizon and, therefore, an incentive to
adopt shortsighted policies. Although previous studies have tested the effects
of political instability and fragmentation on seignorage, budget deficits, debt,
and inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on unemployment
have been undertaken.
Although these political-microeconomic aspects of unemployment are of
intrinsic interest, we also stress that properly controlling for them is essential
if we are to appropriately test political business cycle models that focus on
shorter-run movements of unemployment related to elections or ideological
changes in the government.
2.4. Previous empirical research
The number of papers testing political business cycle models over time and
countries is now quite extensive. For a comprehensive review with updated
results, readers are referred to Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997). Three
main results emerge from this literature. First, empirical results support the
existence of partisan political business cycles, with greatest support for the
“rational” partisan model, which specifies that partisan movements in unem-
ployment and output will be temporary rather than permanent. Second, the
partisan effects are stronger in countries where governments are stable and
clearly identifiable as right or left-wing. Third, evidence of “opportunistic”
political business cycles is weak.
None of the existing studies uses a continuous measure of partisan iden-
tity, accounts for differences between parliamentary and non-parliamentary
regimes, or simultaneously accounts for electoral pressures and labor-market
conditions as determinants of unemployment differences. Our analysis ex-
tends the existing literature in these directions, and also provides an update
adding an additional six years of data.
3. The data set
The data set used in the empirical investigation covers 13 industrialized coun-
tries (the U.S. and 12 European Union – E.U. countries)4 for the period
between 1960 and 1999. The main macroeconomic series analyzed is the
quarterly unemployment rate for each country, which provides the depend-
ent variable for our empirical analysis. Unemployment rates were obtained
from the OECD-Main Economic Indicators. As an explanatory variable, we
include a measure of international demand in our empirical models. For
this purpose we have employed the IMF’s quarterly growth of the industrial
production index aggregated over industrialized nations.
In order to take account labor market conditions in the determination of
unemployment rates, we have gathered information on union density rates,
union coverage rates, and measures of bargaining centralization and coordin-
ation. These data have been obtained from the OECD Employment Outlook
(1994, 1997) reports and augmented with data from Current Population
Survey for the U.S.
We have also gathered information on political conditions and
institutions.5 Governments have been classified as majority/minority or co-
alition/single party governments in order to test hypotheses about political
fragmentation and economic performance. Data on presidential and parlia-
mentary election dates and outcomes were collected in order to construct
variables to be used in testing political business cycle models.
Measurement of governments’ left-right partisan identities presents ad-
ditional complications. For parliamentary regimes, we first categorized all
parties participating in governments as left- or right-wing parties. We then
calculated the percentage of deputies in governing coalitions who belonged,
respectively, to left- and right-wing parties. We employ the percentage of
right-wing deputies in the governing coalition as a continuous measure of par-
tisanship for parliamentary regimes. For presidential regimes (only the U.S.),
we assume that the party affiliation of the president determines the partisan-
ship of the government; i.e., under a Republican president, the government is
100% right-leaning. For semi-presidential regimes (France and Finland), our
continuous measure of partisanship is a simple average of parliamentary and
presidential partisanship measures. Because most previous studies have used
discrete measures of partisanship, for purposes of comparability we have also
constructed a discrete measure. To do so, we classify a regime as “right-wing”
when our underlying continuous variable exceeds 50%.
Much of our analysis will focus on macroeconomic reactions to changes
in the partisan composition of the government. When we use a continuous
variable to measure partisanship, measuring the change in partisanship is
straightforward. However, in most previous studies, changes in partisan iden-
tity have also been indicated by discrete variables. This creates additional
ambiguities; for example, if a left-oriented coalition changes its composition
by moving to the right, but remains a left-oriented coalition, has a change in
partisan identity occurred? Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini assume, that partisan
change occurs whenever there is a “substantial” change in the make-up of
a coalition. We follow a more mechanical procedure when measuring dis-
crete changes: we code a discrete change, only when our continuous variable
moves across the 50% threshold.6
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for political data by country. In
our sample period, the average time between elections or changes in a
government’s ideology was 11.4 quarters. Finland and Italy had the lowest
percentage time governed by right-wing governments, while Belgium, the
Netherlands, and the U.K. had the highest. All governments in Belgium, Ger-
many, and Netherlands were coalitions; there were no coalition governments
in Spain and in the U.K. Among parliamentary regimes, only Belgium, Ger-
many and Netherlands had majority governments during the entire sample
period.
4. Empirical analysis
In this section we describe the results of our empirical analysis. As we have
noted, the dependent variable in the analysis is the level of the unemployment
rate. Explanatory variables include a proxy for international demand growth,
measures of labor market structure, measures of political fragmentation, and
variables capturing political business cycle effects. All equations also include
fixed effects for individual countries, although we do not report estimates for
those coefficients.7
In order to test the hypotheses, regressions corresponding to the general
form specified below were estimated (variables are indexed by both countries
and time):
Uit = f(Uit−1, Uit−2, . . . , AGIPIIndt−1, LMCit−1, FRAGit−1, POLit−1) (1)
In this equation, U is the quarterly unemployment rate,8 AGIPIInd is an-
nual growth of the industrial production index for industrialized economies
(providing a measure of international demand), LMC is a vector of variables
characterizing labor market conditions, FRAG is a vector of variables indic-
ating political fragmentation, and POL is a vector of political variables used
to test PBC. All variables enter the model with lags as specified. Table 2
provides a detailed summary of definitions for all variables employed in the
analysis.
Table 1. Country statistics
Country Number of % Time of % Time of % Time of Average time
elections or right-wing coalition majority between an Period
changes in governments governments governments election or a analyzed
ideology in office in office in office change
Austria 11 35 56 96 14.4 60.1–99:2
Belgium 11 82 100 100 7.4 79:1–99:2
Denmark 15 45 68 6 7.9 70:1–99:2
Finland 23 0 28 100 6.9 60:1–99:2
France 10 45 23 100 11.8 70:1–99:2
Germany 12 62 100 100 12.6 62:1–99:3
Italy 10 10 84 68 15.8 60:1–99:2
Netherlands 6 67 100 100 11.7 82:1–99:2
Portugal 5 62 17 67 13.2 83:2–99:2
Spain 7 40 0 31 12.7 77:2–99:2
Sweden 10 31 28 15 11.8 70:1–99:2
U.K. 10 67 0 98 15.8 60:1–99:2
U.S.A. 10 53 54 100 15.8 60:1–99:2
Total number of elections or changes in ideology 144
Average duration all governments 11.4
Table 2. Summary of definitions for all variables employed in the analysis.
Abreviation Definition
U Quarterly unemployment rate.
AGIPIInd Annual growth of the industrial production index aggregated over
industrialized economies.
UnionM Percentage of wage and salary workers who are members of unions.
UnionC Percentage of wage and salary workers covered by collective
bargaining agreements.
BargL Index measure of the average “bargaining level” in a country.
Bargaining can occur at the level of individual companies, at
the industry level, or at the level of multi-industry employer and
worker organizations. Assumes integer values from 1 to 3, with 3
indicating the most centralized bargaining systems.
BargC Index measure of bargaining coordination between employer and
labor organizations. Takes on integer values from 1 to 3, with higher
values indicating greater coordination.
Coal Dummy variable equal to 1 for coalition governments, otherwise
equal to 0. See note 9.
Min Dummy variable equal to 1 for minority governments, otherwise
equal to 0.See note 10.
OEBN Dummy variable equal to 1 in the N quarters preceding an election
and 0 otherwise. N = 4, 6, 8.
OEAN Dummy variable equal to 1 in the N quarters after an election and
0 otherwise. N = 4, 6, 8.
PP1 Dummy variable equal to 1 when PP2 (defined below) exceeds 0;
equal to –1 when PP2 is less than or equal to 0.
PP2 For a parliamentary government, PP2 is the percentage of deputies
belonging to right-wing parties forming government, less 50%. For
a presidential government (the U.S.) percentage control of the gov-
ernment is equal to 100% for Republican presidents and 0% for
Democratic presidents, and PP2 is this percentage less 50%. For a
semi-presidential regime (France and Finland) PP2 is an average of
the percentage partisan strength of the parliament and the president,
less 50%.
UnionM∗PPk Interaction variable between UnionM and PP1 or PP2 (i.e., k = 1,2).
UnionC∗PPk Interaction variable between UnionC and PP1 or PP2 (k = 1,2).
BargL∗PPk Interaction variable between BargL and PP1 or PP2 (k = 1,2).
BargC∗PPk Interaction variable between BargC and PP1 or PP2 (k = 1,2).
RP1N Dummy variable set equal to 1 (–1) for the N quarters including
and following a discrete change in government (i.e., a change in
PP1) toward the right (left) and otherwise set equal to zero. N = 4,
6, 8.
RP2N For the N quarters following a change in government, RP2N is
equal to the change in PP2; otherwise equal to 0. N = 4, 6, 8.
Table 2. Continued.
Abreviation Definition
RP3N A dummy variable 1 in the first N quarters of a right-wing gov-
ernment and –1 in the first N quarters of a left-wing government
(where partisanship is defined by PP1). N = 4, 6, 8.
RP4N For the first N quarters following an election or change in govern-
ment, RP4N is equal to PP2; otherwise equal to 0.
We employ four variables as measures of labor market structure in the
vector LMC. The first two variables measure union power. UnionM is the
percentage of wage and salary workers who are members of unions and
UnionC is the percentage of wage and salary workers covered by collective
bargaining agreements. The next two variables describe collective bargaining
institutions. BargL is an index measure of the average “bargaining level” in
a country. Bargaining can occur at the level of individual companies, at the
industry level, or at the level of multi-industry employer and worker organiz-
ations. BargL assumes integer values from 1 to 3, with 3 indicating the most
centralized bargaining systems. BargC is an index measure of bargaining
coordination between employer and labor organizations. This also takes on
integer values from 1 to 3, with higher values indicating greater coordina-
tion. The OECD Employment Outlook (1994, 1997) reports data on these
four labor market variables for all countries in our sample. Five data points
(for most countries 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1994) are available. For the union
membership and coverage variables a continuous series was interpolated from
these data points. For the U.S. only, annual data on union membership for
1973 to 1999 were available front the Current Population Survey.
Two dummy variables are included in the FRAG vector. The first vari-
able, Coal, equals one when a government is formed by a coalition of parties
and otherwise equals zero.9 The second variable, Min, equals one when the
parties forming the government fail to gain a majority in the parliament, and
otherwise equals zero.10 Both Coal and Min indicate higher governmental
fragmentation, thus positive coefficients are expected.
A variety of variables for the POL vector are suggested by alternative
political business cycle theories. We will discuss the specification of these
variables as the results are presented.
Table 3. Estimates of a “baseline” model.
Panel
U(–1) –1.35∗∗∗ –1.36∗∗∗ –1.36∗∗∗ –1.36∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(55.1) (55.2) (55.1) (55.2) (54.9)
U(–2) –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–3.5) (–3.5) (–3.4) (–3.5) (–3.4)
U(–3) –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗
(–9.6) (–9.6) (–9.8) (–9.7) (–9.6)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.97∗∗∗ –.97∗∗∗ –.94∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗ –.97∗∗∗
(–4.8) (–4.8) (–4.7) (–4.8) (–4.8)
UnionM(–1) .002∗∗ .001
(2.0) (.9)
UnionC(–1) 0.001 .0006
(.6) (.3)
BargL(–1) –.12∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–2.7) (–2.5)
BargC(–1) .003 .06
(.08) (1.3)
Coal(–1) .04∗∗ .04∗∗ .03∗∗ .04∗∗ .04∗∗
(2.1) (2.0) (1.9) (2.0) (2.0)
Min(–1) –.02 –.02 –.02 –.01 –.03
(–.8) (–.7) (–.9) (–.7) (–1.1)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not
reported.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10%
level.
4.1. A baseline empirical model
In Table 3 we present estimates of a “baseline” model that excludes political
business cycle variables. Several findings are immediately evident. First, we
note that the international demand variable (AGIPIInd) is significant, imply-
ing that strong demand is associated with lower unemployment. Second, the
significance of lagged unemployment rates also shows that unemployment
moves in a highly inertial fashion.11
Turning to labor market issues, we find that two labor market structure
variables, UnionM and BargL, are significant. Higher unionization is asso-
ciated with higher unemployment, as one would expect if unionization is
a source of pressure for labor market rigidities. However, more centralized
bargaining is associated with lower unemployment. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that centralization promotes internalization of cross-industry ex-
ternalities, perhaps by encouraging individual unions to limit demands when
all other unions are making similar concessions.12 Finally, the results also
show that political fragmentation is associated with higher unemployment
rates. The coalition government variable has a significant positive coefficient,
suggesting that divided governments are less successful at implementing
policies that keep unemployment rates low.
Estimates of our “baseline” model demonstrate the potential importance
of political-microeconomic influences in the determination of unemployment,
and underscore the need to include variables to control for them when test-
ing for electoral effects. In our subsequent modifications of the empirical
model, we will continue to include UnionM, BargL, and Coal as explanatory
variables. These variables are consistently signed and frequently statistically
significant in the estimations that follow.
4.2. Opportunistic political business cycles
The Nordhaus model predicts that macroeconomic conditions will be ma-
nipulated around election dates in order to maximize incumbents’ reelection
chances. According to the theory, unemployment will fall before elections
and then return to a normal level in the post-election period. To test this
hypothesis, we augment our baseline model with two variables that were
employed by Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) to capture pre- and post-
election movements. OEBN takes a value of 1 in the N quarters preceding an
election and is otherwise equal to zero; OEAN takes a value of 1 in the N
quarters after an election and is otherwise equal to zero. For both variables,
N takes on the values 4, 6, and 8 in alternative estimations.
For this estimation elections separated by less than two years were ex-
cluded from the analysis in order to insure that the pre- and post-election
dummy variables would not coincide. Empirical results presented in Table 4
show that none of the political variables is statistically significant at con-
ventional significance levels. In unreported regressions, we find that more
flexible specifications of political business cycle effects like those suggested
by Haynes and Stone (1989) also fail to support the Nordhaus hypothesis.
Although these results do not support the Nordhaus political business
cycle, they do not necessarily reject opportunistic models that build in the
rational expectations assumption. Those models predict cycles in policy in-
Table 4. Tests for opportunistic effects.
Before (OEBN) After (OEAN)
N=4 N=6 N=8 N=4 N=6 N=8
U(–1) 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(54.2) (54.2) (54.2) (54.2) (54.2) (54.2)
U(–2) –.13∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗
(–3.1) (–3.2) (–3.1) (–3.2) (–3.2) (–3.2)
U(–3) –.24∗∗∗ –.24∗∗∗ –.24∗∗∗ –.24∗∗∗ –.24∗∗∗ –.24∗∗∗
(–10.1) (–10.1) (–10.1) (–10.1) (–10.1) (–10.1)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.74∗∗∗ –.74∗∗∗ –.74∗∗∗ –.73∗∗∗ –.73∗∗∗ –.75∗∗∗
(–3.6) (–3.7) (–3.7) (–3.6) (–3.6) (–3.7)
UnionM(–1) .002∗ .002∗ .002∗ .002∗ .002∗ .002∗
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6)
BargL(–1) –.08∗ –.08∗ –.08∗ –.08∗ –.08∗ –.09∗
(–1.7) (–1.7) (–1.7) (–1.7) (–1.7) (–1.8)
Coal(–1) .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.5) (2.6) (2.6)
OEBN –.007 –.008 –.008
(–.5) (–.6) (–.5)
OEAN –.005 .003 .01
(–.3) (.2) (1.1)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not reported.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level.
struments, but not (necessarily) cycles in real outcomes. Because our focus is
on unemployment, we do not pursue such distinctions here.
4.3. Testing partisan theory with permanent effects
If the policies of left and right parties create permanent differences in un-
employment rates, our baseline model is appropriately modified by adding a
variable indicating the partisan identity of the government. Following Ales-
ina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) we first augment our model with the discrete
dummy variable PP1, which is set equal to 1 when right-wing parties rule and
is set equal to –1 when left wing parties rule. According to the conventional
hypothesis, a positive sign is expected on the estimated coefficient. We noted
Table 5. Tests for partisan theory with permanent effects.
Panel
Discrete variable (PP1) Continuous variable (PP2)
U(–1) 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(55.0) (55.0)
U(–2) –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–3.4) (–3.4)
U(–3) –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗
(–9.7) (–9.6)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.93∗∗∗ –.94∗∗∗
(–4.7) (–4.7)
UnionM(–1) .001 .001
(1.0) (.9)
BargL(–1) –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗
(–2.0) (–2.0)
Coal(–1) .04∗∗ .03∗
(2.1) (1.7)
PPk(–1) .007 .0002
(.8) (1.5)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects
in the panel estimations were not reported.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant
at the 10% level.
earlier that it is possible to replace the discrete party indicator with a con-
tinuous measure. Our continuous measure is PP2, indicating the right-wing
“percentage” strength of the government, expressed as a deviation from the
50% midpoint. Again, a positive sign is predicted.
Empirical results are reported in Table 5. As in Alesina, Cohen, and
Roubini (1997) the discrete party variable, PP1, is not statistically significant
but has the expected sign. The results using the continuous variable, PP2,
provide slightly stronger support for the existence of permanent partisan
effects, but again the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Because partisan effects could depend on labor market conditions, re-
gressions were also run using interactions of the partisan variables with the
variables describing labor market structure. Table 6 shows that the interac-
tion between the continuous partisanship variable and union membership is
consistently positive and significant. Reminiscent of the findings of Alvarez,
Garrett, and Lange (1991), this result indicates that the combination of strong
unions and right-wing governments produces especially high unemployment
rates. However, the interaction of BargL and the continuous partisan variable
is negative and marginally significant, suggesting that the high unemployment
rates prevailing under right-wing governments are reduced when bargaining
is more highly centralized.
4.4. Testing the rational partisan theory (RPT)
Rational partisan theories predict that transient unemployment changes will
follow election surprises. While the theory is clear that the surprise element
of an election outcome is the key to subsequent changes in unemployment,
it is often difficult to measure the extent of the surprise component in a
given election result. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) implicitly assume
that incumbent governments are expected to win all elections. Under this
assumption, election surprises occur when partisan changes take place.
This suggests that our baseline model should be augmented with RP1N, a
dummy variable set equal to 1 (–1) for the N quarters including and following
a discrete change in government toward the right (left) and otherwise set
equal to zero. As before, changes in government can also be measured in
with a continuous variable. We define RP2N to be the change in the right-
wing percentage strength of the government in the N quarters starting with a
change in governmental ideology. A positive sign on the estimated coefficient
is predicted for each of these variables. Once again, N is permitted to take the
values 4, 6, and 8 in alternative estimations.
Results for models employing RP1N and RP2N are presented in Table
7. The discrete change variable, RP1N, is statistically significant at the 5%
significance level or better for N equal to 4, 6 or 8. The alternative con-
tinuous variable, RP2N, generates even stronger supportive results. Estimated
coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1%
significance level for N equal to 4, 6, and 8.
So far tests of the RPT model have been performed under the assumption
that changes in governments’ partisan identities are a good proxy for electoral
surprises.13 That is, individuals expect the governing party to he elected for
another term. An alternative assumption is that individuals regard the out-
come of an election to he uncertain. Under the assumption that left or right
party wins are equally likely, any election outcome produces some surprise,
even if there is no change in governmental control. Under this scenario, a
better specification of the discrete political variable would be provided by
RP3N, a variable equal to 1 (–1) in the first N quarters following an election
Table 6. Tests for partisan theory with permanent effects and interaction
variables.
Panel
Discrete variable (PP1) Continuous variable (PP2)
U(–1) 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(54.9) (54.8)
U(–2) –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–3.4) (–3.4)
U(–3) –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗
(–9.6) (–9.6)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.95∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗
(–4.8) (–4.8)
UnionM(–1) .001 .001
(1.5) (1.5)
BargL(–1) –.11∗∗ –.11∗∗
(–2.3) (–2.4)
Coal(–1) .02 .01
(1.4) (.9)
PPk(–1) .02 .0008
(.7) (1.1)
UnionM∗PPk .0008∗ .00002∗∗∗
(1.9) (2.7)
BargL∗PPk –.02 –.0008∗
(–1.3) (–1.8)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects
in the panel estimations were not reported.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant
at the 10% level.
or governmental change in which right (left) parties govern. Analogously,
an appropriate continuous variable is given by RP4N, which is right-wing
percentage strength of the government (expressed as a deviation from 50%)
in the first N quarters following and election or governmental change. For
each of these variables, N is set equal to 4, 6, and 8 in alternative estimations.
Table 8 provides the results for these variants of the rational partisan model.
Table 7. Rational partisan theory: unemployment levels and pooled sample (changes in
ideology = electoral surprises)
Discrete variable Percentage variable
RP14(–1) RP16(–1) RP18(–1) RP24(–1) RP26(–1) RP28(–1)
U(–1) 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(55.1) (55.0) (54.9) (55.1) (55.0) (54.9)
U(–2) –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–3.4) (–3.4) (–3.4) (–3.4) (–3.3) (–3.4)
U(–3) –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗
(–9.7) (–9.7) (–9.6) (–9.7) (–9.7) (–9.7)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.94∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗ –.96∗∗∗ –.95∗∗∗
(–4.8) (–4.8) (–4.8) (–4.8) (–4.8) (–4.8)
UnionM(–1) .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
(.9) (.9) (.9) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0)
BargL(–1) –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗
(–2.1) (–2.2) (–2.1) (–2.2) (–2.2) (–2.2)
Coal(–1) .04∗∗ .03∗∗ .03∗∗ .03∗ .03∗ .03∗
(2.0) (2.0) (2.0) (1.8) (1.6) (1.6)
RP(–1) .06∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ .03∗∗ .0007∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗
(2.8) (3.0) (2.3) (3.1) (3.3) (2.6)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not reported.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level.
The results indicate that the discrete variable, RP3N, is significant at the
5% level or better for each value of N, while the continuous variable, RP4N,
is statistically significant at the 1% level for each value of N. While these
results are “consistent” with predictions of the rational partisan models, they
also highlight the problem of identifying electoral surprises. We have now
found that the RPT model is supported under two different assumptions about
pre-election expectations. If we assume that incumbents are expected to win
or if we assume that elections seen as toss-ups, results of the RPT model are
comparable. Of course, neither of these assumptions is likely to be perfectly
correct, so it should not be surprising that both versions of the model work
well empirically.
Our final exercise was to include labor market interactions with partisan
variables in the RPT models. Our hypothesis was that more severe labor mar-
Table 8. Tests for rational partisan theory: unemployment levels and pooled data (incumbent
ideology = electoral surprise).
Discrete variable Percentage variable
RP34(–1) RP36(–1) RP38(–1) RP44(–1) RP46(–1) RP48(–1)
U(–1) 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(55.1) (55.1) (55.1) (55.1) (55.1) (55.1)
U(–2) –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗ –.13∗∗∗ –.14∗∗∗
(–3.4) (–3.3) (–3.4) (–3.4) (–3.3) (–3.4)
U(–3) –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗ –.23∗∗∗
(–9.7) (–9.8) (–9.7) (–9.7) (–9.8) (–9.7)
AGIPIInd(–1) –.94∗∗∗ –.92∗∗∗ –.92∗∗∗ –.94∗∗∗ –.92∗∗∗ –.92∗∗∗
(–4.7) (–4.6) (–4.6) (–4.7) (–4.6) (–4.6)
UnionM(–1) .001 .001 .001 .001 .0009 .0009
(.9) (.8) (.8) (.9) (.8) (.8)
BargL(–1) –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗ –.10∗∗
(–2.0) (–2.1) (–2.1) (–2.0) (–2.1) (–2.1)
Coal(–1) .03∗∗ .03∗ .03∗ .03∗ .02 .02
(2.0) (1.8) (1.9) (1.7) (1.4) (1.4)
RP(–1) .03∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .02∗∗ .0008∗∗∗ .0008∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
(2.4) (2.9) (2.1) (2.9) (3.5) (2.7)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes. The coefficients on the dummies included to control for fixed effects are not reported.
t-statistics are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level; ∗∗ significant at the 5% level; ∗ significant at the 10% level.
ket restrictions should amplify partisan cycles. Results of these estimations
produced no significant interactions, however, and are not reported in the
paper.
5. Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of the political determinants of unemploy-
ment rates in a sample of industrialized economies for the 1960–1999 period.
Our analysis considers both microeconomic and macroeconomic sources of
politically induced variations in unemployment. At a microeconomic level,
the analysis shows that labor market structure and political fragmentation
are important determinants of unemployment. Specifically, labor union mem-
bership rates and the presence of coalition governments are associated with
higher unemployment rates, while centralized wage bargaining institutions
are associated with lower unemployment rates.
When we extend the model to include both microeconomic and macroe-
conomic impacts, we find strong support for transient cycles predicted by the
rational partisan (RPT) models of Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Chappell and
Keech (1988), but little support for Nordhaus’s opportunistic political busi-
ness cycle model or Hibbs’s partisan model with permanent unemployment
effects.
Although these results on political business cycles generally confirm those
of Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997), our results make a stronger case in
several ways. First, by including controls for labor market conditions and
political fragmentation, our analysis embeds tests of political impacts in a
more complete political model of unemployment determination. Second, we
have shown that the key results are robust to refinements in measurement of
partisanship. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) used simple discrete meas-
ures of the left-right stance of a government. We have employed a continuous
measure of partisan identity. Our measure makes use of detailed information
on the composition of parliamentary coalitions and distinguishes between
parliamentary and non-parliamentary regimes. Results for the partisan mod-
els are stronger when our continuous measure replaces the simple discrete
variable. Third, we have shown that results for the rational partisan model
are robust to alternative assumptions about the nature of electoral surprises.
Evidence is supportive whether one assumes that incumbents are expected
to win or assumes that all election outcomes are uncertain. Finally, we have
shown that results supporting the rational partisan model are robust to the
addition of six years of additional data.
Support for the rational partisan model is tempered by two concerns. First,
as with most previous studies, we have not explicitly measured the surprise
element in election outcomes. A distinguishing feature of the RPT model
is the importance it attaches to such surprises in producing cyclical effects;
consequently, a truly discriminating test should measure those surprises and
investigate their impacts more directly. Second, we found no evidence of in-
teractions between partisanship and labor market structure in our tests of the
RPT model. Because the RPT theory relies on some labor market rigidities
(specifically, long-term contracts) to produce partisan cycles, the absence of
interaction effects weakens support for it. Future investigations would benefit
from additional attention to these issues.
Notes
1. For detailed surveys on the political business cycle (PBC) literature see Price (1997), and
Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997).
2. Other opportunistic models incorporating rational expectations include Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986), Rogoff (1990), and Person and Tabellini (1990).
3. Although the rational expectations hypothesis is often linked to a policy ineffectiveness
result (implying no real effects of anticipated policy actions), this result also depends on
a variety of ancillary assumptions made to characterize the economy.
4. The included EU countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The only EU coun-
tries excluded are Greece and Ireland. Greece was excluded from the sample because of
missing quarterly unemployment data; Ireland was excluded because of missing data on
labor market institutions.
5. Details of the political data sources are provided in Appendix 1.
6. Following this procedure, we do code several observations differently than Alesina, Co-
hen, and Roubini (1997). For example, from the 1st quarter of 1970 to the 2nd quarter of
1983 a single left-wing party (Socialist Party of Austria) ruled in Austria. Alesina, Cohen,
and Roubini (1997) and the authors of this paper classified this government as left-wing.
After the 2nd quarter of 1983, the Socialist Party formed a coalition with the Freedom
Party of Austria, which is a right-wing party, but the overall coalition was still best de-
scribed as left-wing. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1997) reported this as a change to the
right. In this paper, no change in the orientation is reported when the discrete variable is
used, but some change occurs when using the percentage variable.
7. For all regressions, an F-test for the coefficients for the dummies was performed, and in
all cases these coefficient estimates were jointly statistically significant.
8. We measure unemployment as a level in all reported results. There is some question as to
whether unemployment has a unit root. For most individual countries (with the U.S. as a
notable exception), we are unable to reject the hypothesis that unemployment contains a
unit root. This is partly due to the low power of the Dickey-Fuller tests, and the fact that
samples are short for individual countries. However, for results over the full panel we do
reject the unit root hypothesis. We further note that, a priori, a unit root for unemployment
is implausible because its range is restricted. We have also estimated models in which the
dependent variable is expressed as a deviation from an estimated trend. This specification
reduces concerns with unit roots and produces similar results concerning political business
cycle effects, but does not permit us to capture the microeconomic determinants of the
trend values themselves.
9. This definition is altered for presidential (the U.S.) and semi-presidential (France and Fin-
land) regimes. For the United States, a coalition is assumed to exist when the Presidents’
party lacks a majority in Congress. For France and Finland, a coalition is assumed to exist
when the President and the Government have different ideologies.
10. Presidential and semi-presidential regimes were all classified as majorities.
11. The optimal number of lags was decided according to the Schwarz Bayesian Inform-
ation Criterion in all specifications. The Breusch-Godfrey test was used to test for
autocorrelation.
12. Supporting this conjecture, in unreported regressions we find that the negative impact of
BargL on unemployment is largely attributable to a strong effect among countries at the
highest bargaining level classification; i.e., countries with multi-industry bargaining.
13. Recall that partisan theory argues that real partisan effects only occur due to expectational
errors about the ideology of the newly elected government.
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